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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with the relationship between education, wages and working 
behaviour. The work is partly motivated by the sharp distinction in the literature between the 
returns to education and the effect of wages on labour supply. Education is the investment that 
cumulates in the form of human capital while labour supply is the utilization rate of that 
stock. Yet, variation in education is usually the basis for identifying labour supply models – 
education  is assumed to determine wages but not  affect  labour supply. Moreover, it is 
commonly assumed that the private rate of return to education can be found from the 
schooling coefficient in a log-wage equation. Yet, the costs of education are largely 
independent of its subsequent utilisation but the benefits will be higher the greater the 
utilisation rate. Thus the returns will depend on how intensively that capital is utilised and we 
would expect that those who intend to work least to also invest least in human capital. Indeed, 
the net (of tax liabilities and welfare entitlements) return to education will be a complex 
function of labour supply and budget constraint considerations. 
Here we attempt to model the relationship between wages, work, education and the 
tax/welfare system allowing for the endogeneity of education as well for the correlations 
between the unobservable components of wages and working behaviour. We use the estimates 
to simulate the effect of a new UK policy designed to increase education for children from 
low-income households. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the relationship between education, wages and 
working behaviour. The work  has two main motivations. Firstly, there is a sharp 
distinction in the literature between the returns to education and the effect of wages on 
labour supply – the former ignores the fact that labour supply is the utilisation rate of 
human capital, while the latter assumes that education can be used to identify the 
model by excluding education from labour supply equations but not from the 
determination of wages. Education is the investment that cumulates in the form of 
human capital while labour supply is the utilization rate of that stock. Yet, education 
is usually the basis for identifying labour supply models – it is typically assumed that 
education determines wages but  does  not affect labour supply.  Moreover, it is 
commonly assumed that the private rate of return to education can be found from the 
schooling coefficient in a log-wage equation. Yet, the costs of education are largely 
independent of its subsequent utilisation but the benefits will be higher the greater is 
the utilisation rate. Thus the returns will depend on how intensively that capital is 
utilised. Thus we would expect that those who intend to work least will also wish to 
invest least in human capital.  
A second consideration is that the system of poverty relief may act as a “tax” on 
the acquisition of human capital since welfare payments may be “means-tested” 
against income. On the other hand, in-work welfare may act as a wage subsidy that 
reduces the net costs of on-the-job general training. The implication is that the net (of 
tax liabilities and welfare entitlements) return to education will be a complex function 
of labour supply preference and budget constraint considerations. One aspect of this is 
the effect of education on labour market participation  – an issue that has attracted 
relatively little attention in the literature despite its apparent importance
1.  
Finally, we are concerned about the arguments usually used to justify education 
subsidies. In the context of higher education the justification is usually in terms of 
credit market constraints or externalities. In fact, there is very limited support for the 
significance of either of these arguments in the empirical literature. The credit 
constraint literature is reviewed in Carneiro and Heckman (2002) who argue strongly 
 
1 Indeed, there is little evidence even of the effect of selectivity into work on the estimated returns to 
education conditional on working.   2
that the strong correlation that exists between education and parental income is most 
likely due to the strong correlations between income across the lifecycle and between 
early deprivation and intellectual development. The externality literature is reviewed 
in Sianesi and van Reenan (2003) who also find little supporting evidence. However, 
a standard second best argument for subsidising education can be made that does not 
rely on externalities or market failure. That is,  if education and labour supply are 
jointly determined then a distortionary tax that reduces labour supply might be offset 
by a subsidy that increases education (see Trostel (1993)). 
Thus, h ere we attempt to model the relationship between wages, work,  and 
education incorporating  the tax/welfare system  and  allowing for the  possible 
endogeneity of education as well for the correlations between the unobservable 
components of wages and working behaviour.  
Our analysis is conducted on UK data: the UK has an early school leaving 
problem in the sense that a high proportion of individuals in the population will have 
left school at the earliest possible opportunity. Indeed, although the higher education 
participation rate has increased dramatically over the last 10 years and there have been 
considerable efforts to increase the examination performance of children at the age of 
16, this has not been reflected in an increase in post-compulsory participation and 
there is still a significant minority that leave school at the age of 16 with minimal 
formal qualifications. The problem is regarded as acute and the present government is 
introducing payments to children from poor backgrounds to stay on at school beyond 
16 (Educational Maintenance Allowances, EMAs)
2.  
We use the estimates to simulate the net private returns to education, and hence 
the returns to the government from encouraging greater education participation. We 
also simulate the effect of an  EMA induced increase in education and hence on net 
incomes and tax revenue net of welfare payments.   
2. Data 
  A major motivation for our work is that hours of work (and participation) and 
education are jointly determined. The empirical labour supply literature has not 
explicitly acknowledged this possibility so we begin by establishing that there is some 
 
2 This follows their successful piloting in a number of areas. See Ashworth et al (2002) for detailed 
evaluation.   3
correlation. The data from the UK Family Resources Survey data (pooled over all of 
the available years, 1994/95-2000/01) were selected to be couples (married or 
cohabiting) in single Benefit Unit households (i.e. without other non-dependent adults 
in the household), where the male partner is aged 25-64 and the female aged 25-59, 
neither are self-employed, and there is at least one dependent child present in the 
household.   
  The FRS is the dataset of choice for the econometric modelling of UK labour 
supply since it has been developed by the UK Department of Work and Pensions for 
policy analysis purposes. The selected dataset consists of 28,572 households and the 
breakdown of labour market status is given in Table 1. This shows t hat male 
participation is high and that, conditional on having a non-participating male partner, 
female non-participation is disproportionately likely. Thus, there is a 6% core of 
“workless” households. Conditional on having a working male partner there is a large 
proportion of part-time working mothers in the UK. Table 2 shows the means and 
standard deviations of the data used in estimation broken down by labour market 
status.  
Table 1      Labour Market Status (%) 
Mother’s status 
Father’s status 
Non-participant  Part-time  Full-time  Total 
Non-participant  6.11  1.46  1.31   8.88 
Participant  25.14  37.33  28.65  91.12 
Total  31.25  38.79  29.96  100.00 
 
3. Methodology 
  Modelling labour supply choices in the face of complex budget constraints has 
proved to be problematic for researchers and a popular compromise in the literature 
has been to adopt a discrete choice methodology where individuals are assumed to 
choose between a small number of  discrete  alternatives. We follow B lundell and 
MaCurdy (1999)  who do  static labour supply modelling  in  the p resence of non-
convexities by discretising the hours distribution. Modelling labour supply behaviour 
in the context of non-convex budget constraints gives rise to a number of empirical 
difficulties, as summarised in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). Essentially, the choice 
model is simplified to be discrete choice in order to make it empirically tractable.   4
Table 2 Married & Cohabiting Couples Descriptive Statistics by Labour Supply Status
Means and standard deviations
Variable      Labour Supply
Male Labour Supply      Non-work      Work
Female Labour Supply      Non-work      Part-time      Full-time      Non-work      Part-time      Full-time
cohabiting 0.2554 0.1775 0.1765 0.1064 0.0776 0.1021
# kids 0-4 0.8396 0.8206 0.3789 0.6320 0.5107 0.6819 0.8892 0.7949 0.4921 0.6695 0.3775 0.5876
# kids 5-10 0.8408 0.9102 0.8825 0.8733 0.6524 0.7729 0.7079 0.8245 0.7094 0.7928 0.4715 0.6856
# kids 11-15 0.5241 0.7887 0.6403 0.7404 0.5187 0.7420 0.3454 0.6438 0.4962 0.6956 0.5616 0.7135
# kids 16-18 0.1123 0.3502 0.1223 0.3353 0.1310 0.3682 0.1029 0.3302 0.1607 0.3955 0.2323 0.4613
     Male
log wage 2.2652 0.6836 2.2873 0.5441 2.2443 0.5520
education/10 1.6503 0.2272 1.6384 0.1927 1.7179 0.2585 1.7583 0.2692 1.7154 0.2391 1.7398 0.2612
age/10 3.5649 0.8938 3.8863 0.8209 3.9166 0.8094 3.6793 0.7637 3.8806 0.7224 3.9651 0.7354
(age^2)/100 13.5072 6.8884 15.7759 6.6094 15.9930 6.5678 14.1204 5.9253 15.5805 5.7633 16.2625 5.8811
age difference/10 2.6946 0.7156 2.8381 0.6764 2.9955 0.6943 2.9123 0.6045 2.9226 0.5444 2.9372 0.5689
(age difference/10)^2 7.7727 4.3351 8.5113 4.1129 9.4534 4.4697 8.8469 3.7203 8.8379 3.3330 8.9510 3.4599
ethnic origin 0.2125 0.0815 0.1230 0.1072 0.0306 0.0706
     Female
log wage 1.4924 0.4849 1.9603 0.6116 1.7380 0.5743 1.9555 0.5752
education/10 1.6322 0.1826 1.6463 0.1632 1.7682 0.2620 1.7259 0.2272 1.7121 0.2081 1.7587 0.2396
age/10 3.2538 0.8043 3.6002 0.7723 3.6562 0.7201 3.4288 0.7270 3.6683 0.6823 3.7624 0.6800
(age^2)/100 11.2340 5.5686 13.5568 5.7152 13.8847 5.3941 12.2852 5.2215 13.9218 5.1191 14.6181 5.1299
age difference/10 2.3835 0.5842 2.5520 0.5975 2.7350 0.6031 2.6618 0.5389 2.7103 0.4782 2.7346 0.4918
(age difference/10)^2 6.0222 3.1789 6.8691 3.2943 7.8431 3.5101 7.3757 3.0012 7.5745 2.6769 7.7198 2.7512
ethnic origin 0.2062 0.0624 0.1203 0.1085 0.0289 0.0700
# observations 1746 417 374 7182 10666 8187
Notes: FRS 1994/5-2000/1 married or cohabiting couples with children 0-15, father aged 16-64, mother aged 16-59. Monetary units are March 2001 GBP.
Wages are top-coded at the 99.5% level. Variables are scaled for estimation as indicated. Age difference is that between the person and the oldest child.
Hours groupings are defined as Female PT=1-29, FT=30+, Male FT as 1+
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  Our analysis is confined to married couples and we model labour supply choice 
for  women  among three discrete  alternatives (broadly described here as  non-
participation, part-time and full-time) while we assume that male labour supply is 
either full-time or non-participation
3.  The probabilities of being at each position are 
functions of income at that position relative to incomes at all other positions so these 
models estimate the effect of income levels (at each choice) on the probabilities of 
being at each and every choice.  
  Invariably, labour supply modelling has assumed that education is exogenous. 
In contrast the literature on the returns to education has paid a great deal of attention 
to the potential endogeneity of education in determining wages (see Card (1999) for 
example). Our modelling of education is reduced form but we allow for correlations 
between education and unobservables in our wage equations and labour market 
choices. Thus, t he  paper  aims to introduce  education directly into  labour supply 
behaviour and allow agents to act in a theory-consistent way in the presence of non-
convex budget constraints due to taxes and transfers.  The empirical problems 
multiply, because now hours, wages  and education may all be simultaneously 
determined. Furthermore, we have the usual partial-observability problem of wages in 
our labour supply analysis.  We are interested in modelling the labour supply of 
married couples and assume a unitary model of household consensus behaviour (see 
Chiappori (1992) for the alternative, collective, approach). Our model is static in the 
sense that we only consider within-period hours substitution. Labour supply choices 
are limited to that between a small number of discrete alternatives: non-work, part-
time or full-time work for women, and non-work or full-time work for men. No hours 
substitution is allowed within each of the 6 (2*3) household alternatives
4.  
Multinomial choice problems are most often estimated through multinomial 
logit (less often multinimial probit) by making appropriate stochastic assumptions. 
Here we assume joint normality and  hence estimate a multinomial probit. This is 
because of the natural way selection and endogeneity can be introduced via 
multivariate normality. The small number of alternatives we consider make the 
 
3 The proportion of men working less than full-time hours is negligible. 
4 Hoynes (1996) further allows “approximation error” within each alternative. We do not pursue this, in 
lieu of added complexity elsewhere.   6
problem numerically tractable. Furthermore, following Hausman and Wise (1978), we 
allow for taste heterogeneity via random parameters on income
5.  
The main empirical difficulty in all labour supply modelling, is addressing the 
endogeneity of the gross wage. Most often, hard to justify exclusion restrictions are 
imposed, and wages (which are missing for non-workers) are predicted from a 
reduced form first stage regression (see MaCurdy, Greene and Paarsch (1990) for a 
critique). Education is most often included as a wage determinant but assumed not to 
affect hours preferences. This is an assumption we test and reject. In the absence of 
exclusion restrictions, we rely on a joint normality assumption about the error terms 
of the wage and hours equations, together with non-linearities in the tax and benefit 
system to identify the effect of net wages on labour supply. In practise, we estimate 
the wage and labour supply equations jointly and missing wages for men and women 
are integrated out. 
So far we have defined a state of the art (as defined by Blundell and MaCurdy 
(1999)) labour supply model, appropriate for the analysis of behavioural responses to 
tax reforms. This can simply be formalised as follows for the labour supply equation: 
 
**()()
Hmmff
jkjkjkjkjkjk UUgYYXEE ybaaee -=-+++++ 
where j and k denote combinations of household labour supply alternatives, 
*
k U  is 
unobservable utility in state k, g(.) is some function of income differences between 
states (in this case linear),  y is an associated coefficient vector with mean  y  and 
variance  – (1) y + , 
H X is a vector of state-invariant explanatory variables,  jk b is an 
associated vector of coefficients for the comparison between alternatives j and k, 
m E  
is education for the male, 
m
jk a is an associated vector of coefficients for the 
comparison between alternatives j and k, the similar education and coefficient vector 
for females is superscripted f,  jk ee -  is a normally distributed composite error term. 
For the wage equations we have 
ssss
WWW WX be =+ , where 
s W denotes the log wage 
for each spouse  , smf = , 
s
W X is a vector of explanatory variables including 
 
5 Recent generalisations of the multinomial logit allow heterogeneity by including mixing terms which 
are normally distributed (MacFadden and Train (2000) or of unspecified distribution (Hoynes (1996)). 
While these approaches are arguably more general that that presented here, their extension to 
endogenous right hand side variables is not obvious.    7
education, 
s
W b is an associated vector of coefficients and  W e a random error term. The 
novelty of the paper is to extend this conventional model to allow for education to be 
potentially endogenous so we add to our system of labour supply and wage equations, 
education equations for husband and wife, 
ssss
EEE EX be =+ ,  where 
s E denotes the 
level of education, measured as the age left full-time education, for each spouse, 
s
E X is 
a vector of explanatory variables, 
s
E b is an associated vector of coefficients and  E e a 
random error term. 
  All error terms are assumed jointly normal. Identification requires excluded 
instruments in the education equation: determinants of education, which are not also 
determinants of wages and hours of work.  
4.  Identification and Results 
Thus, we have a six-equation model: education, wages, and working behaviour 
for both men and women where wages and education are treated as continuous and 
labour supplies are treated as six possible discrete choices. We allow education to be 
correlated with unobservables in both wages and working behaviour. In addition to 
allowing  for a correlation between the education equation and the residuals in the 
wage equations, we also expect individuals with a greater than average attachment to 
the labour market to have more education than average and so we allow for a 
correlation between the education equation and the labour supply model. While 
normality alone would be sufficient for identification, it would not, of course, be 
convincing. I dentification is achieved through a combination of  restrictions on 
functional form,  plausible  exclusion restrictions and significant tax/welfare non-
linearities. Our instruments for education in the wage and hours equations are 
(quadratic) functions of the age difference between mother and oldest child. The 
rationale for this choice is that women who have their children early may have found 
staying on in education more difficult that those that had their children later in life
6. 
There is a great deal of evidence that teenage motherhood is associated with low 
educational achievement
7. It is, of course, possible that early motherhood has an 
 
6 Evans and Montgomery (1994) find evidence that smoking while young is correlated with education 
but not wages. 
7 Chevalier and Viitanen (2003) produce evidence for the UK that teen motherhood has significant 
adverse consequences for education but not on wages conditional on education.   8
independent effect on wages – perhaps through common family effects. It is also 
possible that young mothers have different attitudes to paid labour market work and 
there is a well developed literature that suggests that fertility and labour supply are 
jointly determined. Ultimately, these exclusion restrictions are empirical assumptions 
and two different tests for the validity of our education instruments appear supportive. 
First, an overidentification (likelihood ratio) test shows that both age-difference 
instruments can be excluded from both the labour supply and the wage equations so 
they are valid to be used as instruments and not controls. Secondly, a likelihood-ratio 
test against the exogenous education model suggests the instruments have sufficient 
explanatory power
8. There is no need for exclusion restrictions between the wage and 
hours equations: the non-linearity of the tax and benefit system is enough to break the 
simple link between potential net incomes and wages.  
The results of the model with endogenous education are given in Table 3
9. The 
age difference variable measures the age of first birth so we find that the longer that 
children are postponed the higher is education
10. This effect is statistically significant 
but, as in Chevalier and Viitanen (2003), modest in size – mothers who postpone 
childbirth by one year have around 0.04 years additional education.  The log-wage 
equations are conventional with large ethnic differences, lower wages for cohabiters 
(compared to married), some strong regional effects, and rates of return to education 
of around 9% for men and 10% for women. This is consistent with the view that the 
UK has an early school-leaving problem
11: many able children, lacking the confidence 
and/or resources to progress further in education and into higher education, leave 
school early despite their ability. 
 
8 The log-likelihood of the restricted, exogenous education, model is 782399 compared to 782477 for 
our preferred model with our exclusion restrictions imposed and allowing education to be endogenous. 
This amounts to a chi-squared of 96 which, with 12 restrictions, has a p-value of 1.00 and amounts to a 
rejection of exogeneity. Moreover, when we drop our exclusion restrictions by including the age 
difference in all equations we find that the log likelihood rises only to 782450 giving a chi-squared of 6 
and, with 10 restrictions, a p-value of only 0.18. Although this  amounts to a rejection of the exclusion 
restrictions, with such a large dataset it is surprising to get a p-value that is below unity and we regard 
this as a powerful result (see Arrellano et al (1999) on this point). 
9 The results presented here are for the model with a  random coefficient on income in the labour 
supply model -  – (1) y +  in our description above – but this is not significantly different from unity. 
10 Note that we are ignoring children who have died and children who have left home. However, this is 
irrelevant since we are not making any structural inferences from this variable  – the education 
equations are strictly reduced form so that all that matters is that this variable is correlated with 
education. 
11 It is also consistent with evidence in Harmon, Oosterbeck and Walker (2000) which uses a variety of 
UK datasets and a variety of instruments to show IV returns of around 10% and higher.   9
In the labour supply equations, non-participation (NP) is the omitted labour 
market state so that a positive estimated coefficient on a variable in the labour supply 
model suggests that such a variable is associated with a preference for non-
participation compared to that state. Thus, the positive coefficients on ethnic origin 
(non-white) suggests that non-white men have a stronger preference for non-
participation than do white men, and non-white women  have a stronger preference 
for NP relative to PT (but weaker reference for FT) than do white women. The  
education coefficients suggest that more educated men have a weaker 
preference for FT compared to NP, while for women they have a stronger preference 
for FT and weaker for PT. This also supports our idea than education and labour 
supply are jointly determined and that the latter is the utilisation rate of the former so 
we would expect a positive correlation. The estimated covariances are also generally 
supportive of the motivation for the work: we find that there is a significant 
correlation between (PT and FT) labour supply  unobservable  preferences and 
education that casts doubt of the traditional identification assumption in labour supply 
models. Thus, for example, men who have stronger than average preferences for work 
have higher than average levels of education.  
The economic variables have the correct signs throughout – higher unearned 
income is associated with a higher probability of NP relative to alternatives for both 
men and women; and for a given unearned income, the higher is  the income 
difference between states (ie the slope of the budget constraint) the greater is the 
chance of choosing the h igher income state.  The multinomial nature of the labour 
supply model makes it difficult to understand the implications of budget constraints 
for the probabilities of being in each state. Thus in Table 4 we present some simple 
simulations of how the baseline probabilities are affected if every individual in the 
sample had £10 added to their net income in each state in turn. In each case these 
effects are consistent with economic theory. In the case of the model with endogenous 
labour supply we find that adding £10 to NP income for women raises the NP 
probability from 0.3 to 0.35 with a 0.04 fall in PT and 0.01 fall in FT; raising PT 
income raises the PT probability by 0.04 (i.e. from 40% to 44%) with a 0.03 fall in NP 
and a 0,01 fall in FT; and raising FT income by £10 raises the FT probability by close  10
Table 3 Married & Cohabiting Couples Labour Supply, Education & Wages
Maximum Likelihood Model Estimates and Standard Errors
Variable      Education/10      Log Wage     Labour Supply
     Male      Female      Male      Female      Male: FT->NP      Female: PT->NP      Female: FT->NP
intercept 1.0755 0.0365 0.9787 0.0301 -1.7396 0.1743 -2.8144 0.2038 1.7194 0.2520 -1.4411 0.2650 3.6268 0.9927
unearned income/100 0.4550 0.2210 0.5392 0.0181 1.1385 0.0377
income difference/100 -0.4790 0.0541 -2.3954 0.0542 -2.3954 0.0542
education/10 0.8872 0.1261 1.0048 0.1331 -0.8180 0.0531 0.6775 0.0734 -0.5681 0.2006
age difference/10 0.3144 0.0212 0.4533 0.0184
(age difference^2)/100 -0.0322 0.0032 -0.0535 0.0031
ethnic origin 0.1098 0.0049 0.0280 0.0042 -0.5267 0.0206 -0.1962 0.0263 0.8025 0.0410 1.1686 0.0553 -0.8484 0.1567
cohabiting -0.0586 0.0077 -0.0437 0.0062 -0.1448 0.0165 0.0154 0.0208 0.6041 0.0345 0.4030 0.0384 -0.3230 0.1292
# kids 0-4 0.0181 0.0030 0.0247 0.0025 -0.0086 0.0083 0.0875 0.0110 0.2018 0.0204 0.3232 0.0278 2.5521 0.1286
# kids 5-10 0.0206 0.0025 0.0258 0.0022 -0.0313 0.0059 -0.0653 0.0078 0.2693 0.0154 -0.0505 0.0199 1.5181 0.0907
# kids 11-15 0.0155 0.0035 0.0263 0.0031 -0.0454 0.0073 -0.0818 0.0091 0.2743 0.0195 -0.1933 0.0199 0.2182 0.0678
# kids 16-18 0.0603 0.0062 0.0643 0.0054 0.0151 0.0108 -0.0326 0.0151 -0.0271 0.0373 -0.1484 0.0377 -0.4422 0.1085
age/10 0.0657 0.0224 0.0201 0.0191 1.1941 0.0558 1.4674 0.0715 -1.4465 0.1210 -0.2498 0.1402 -2.7859 0.5086
(age^2)/100 -0.0181 0.0027 -0.0165 0.0024 -0.1325 0.0068 -0.1757 0.0094 0.1794 0.0152 0.0506 0.0192 0.4359 0.0681
North -0.0380 0.0098 -0.0287 0.0087 -0.0676 0.0226 -0.1003 0.0270 0.3555 0.0573 0.1547 0.0619 0.5014 0.1971
Yorkshire -0.0207 0.0078 -0.0093 0.0067 -0.0622 0.0188 -0.1025 0.0223 0.1257 0.0507 -0.3822 0.0519 0.3940 0.1675
East Midlands -0.0147 0.0081 -0.0046 0.0068 -0.0308 0.0185 -0.1165 0.0239 -0.0512 0.0566 -0.0973 0.0525 0.5766 0.1679
West Midlands -0.0311 0.0080 -0.0042 0.0065 -0.0045 0.0183 -0.0378 0.0220 -0.0440 0.0519 0.1014 0.0515 0.1978 0.1592
East Anglia -0.0063 0.0098 0.0172 0.0083 0.0119 0.0208 -0.1255 0.0275 -0.4800 0.0984 0.2851 0.0673 1.2915 0.2282
Greater London 0.0595 0.0069 0.0605 0.0058 0.1522 0.0190 0.1176 0.0237 0.2989 0.0511 0.6149 0.0602 1.1357 0.1745
South East 0.0349 0.0063 0.0309 0.0054 0.1719 0.0154 -0.0126 0.0185 0.0671 0.0449 -0.0343 0.0455 0.2493 0.1396
South West 0.0078 0.0078 0.0216 0.0066 -0.0526 0.0178 -0.0922 0.0216 -0.1637 0.0622 -0.0514 0.0536 1.7123 0.1928
Wales -0.0075 0.0099 0.0088 0.0088 -0.1376 0.0220 -0.1327 0.0272 0.4836 0.0609 -0.0965 0.0613 0.7352 0.2062
Scotland 0.0054 0.0077 0.0182 0.0067 -0.0101 0.0180 -0.0409 0.0225 0.0195 0.0545 0.1016 0.0536 1.2153 0.1740
1994 -0.0190 0.0057 -0.0173 0.0048 -0.0249 0.0146 0.0037 0.0180 0.3331 0.0409 0.3398 0.0426 1.1682 0.1374
1995 -0.0203 0.0058 -0.0183 0.0050 -0.0356 0.0141 0.0129 0.0172 0.2687 0.0414 0.3017 0.0411 1.0266 0.1325
1996 -0.0132 0.0058 -0.0065 0.0048 -0.0222 0.0137 0.0690 0.0171 0.1736 0.0422 0.1926 0.0417 0.1654 0.1319
1997 -0.0106 0.0060 -0.0086 0.0050 -0.0497 0.0137 -0.0079 0.0178 0.1322 0.0431 0.1572 0.0410 0.3019 0.1321
1998 -0.0010 0.0059 0.0047 0.0049 -0.0993 0.0126 -0.0466 0.0159 0.0203 0.0462 -0.0136 0.0429 -0.0014 0.1351
2000 0.0067 0.0060 0.0113 0.0050 0.0062 0.0134 -0.0201 0.0159 -0.1342 0.0493 -0.0317 0.0428 -0.0412 0.1357
Covariance
sigma 0.2390 0.0014 0.2005 0.0010 0.5151 0.0019 0.5166 0.0024 6.8512 0.1571
Male: FT->NP 0.0550 0.0140 0.1420 0.0110 -0.3100 0.0940 0.1290 0.0420 -0.1284 0.0201 -0.2369 0.0195
Female: PT->NP 0.0950 0.0140 0.1820 0.0110 -0.2140 0.0950 0.0280 0.0440 -0.6473 0.1458
Female: FT->NP -0.0970 0.0100 -0.0800 0.0080 0.3040 0.0950 0.0660 0.0370
Male: Education 0.6190 0.0058 -0.0580 0.0059 0.0585 0.0332
Female: Education 0.0680 0.0305 -0.0280 0.0053
Male: Wage 0.1176 0.0098
Notes: FRS 1994/5-2000/1 married or cohabiting couples with children 0-15, father aged 16-64, mother aged 16-59. Monetary units are March 2001 GBP. Wages are top-coded at the 99.5% level.
Variables are scaled for estimation as indicated.  Age difference is that between the person and the oldest child in the household.  Reference Categories are North West, 1999 and non-white ethnic origin. 
For calculating potential incomes Male FT is defined as 44 hours/week, Female PT as 18, FT at 38.  11
to 0.02 (i.e. from 30% to 32%).  These are relatively large effects from relatively 
modest changes in net incomes. Men, as usual, are a great deal less sensitive: raising 
NP income by £10 reduces the FT probability by 0.03 (ie from 91.5% to 91.2%)
12. 
Table 4  Simulated Effects of Budget Constraint Changes to Labour Supply 
      (% expected in each state) 
  Women  Men 
  NP  PT  FT  NP  FT 
Baseline  30.3  39.7  30.0  8.5  91.5 
Baseline + £10           
NP  5.4  -4.2  -1.2  0.3  -0.3 
PT  -3.2  4.3  -1.1  -  - 
FT  -0.6  -1.0  1.7  -0.3  0.3 
Our results have important implications for both the labour supply and returns 
to education literatures. The usual exclusion restriction in labour supply modelling, 
that education determines wages but not labour supply conditional on wages, is shown 
to be inappropriate. Moreover we find that unobservable determinants of labour 
supply preferences affect education and wages – there are important selection effects 
from using samples of workers only
13.  
4. Policy Simulations 
  Analysing the policy implications of the results require that the labour supply 
effects be computed. Thus, we first analyse the effects of adding an additional year of 
schooling to the whole population. This raises the gross wages of husbands and wives 
and this has direct consequences for the budget constraint, via the tax/welfare system, 
and hence has labour supply consequences. Table 5 shows the effects obtained from 
simulating the effects of the change in the levels of education for the labour supplies 
of  each couple in the sample (uprated to April 1 999) and averaging. These 
calculations allow for the effects of education to impact on labour supply probabilities 
both directly and through the indirect of education on wages and hence on net 
incomes at each labour supply point. That is, the figures in Table 5 allowing for the 
 
12 The corresponding simulations using the model with exogenous education show very similar effects 
for women but suggest even more inelastic responses by men. 
13 We leave the extension to separate FT and PT wages equations to a later date. In earlier work in a 
model with exogenous education (for example Bingley and Walker (1997)) we found important 
selection effects in PT and FT wage equations.   12
impact of the tax and welfare system
14. Adding 1 year of education to all wives has an 
average effect of reducing female non-participation by more than 3%, while adding 2 
years has around double the effect. Adding 1 year to all husbands increases wives’ NP 
probability by about 3% (because we treat husbands’ earnings as unearned income to 
wives) and has a modest effect on male work. 2 years has around double the effect. 
Adding education to both spouses tends to have counteracting effects, because of the 
effect on unearned incomes, so that the net effect of expanding education turns out to 
be modest for women
15.  
Table 5  Simulated Effects of Additional Education 
    (% in expected state and changes) 
Education years +  Female labour supply  Male labour supply 
Male  Female  NP  PT  FT  NP  FT 
Baseline  28.95  40.36  30.69  8.03  91.97 
0  1  -3.22  1.46  1.76  0.04  -0.04 
0  2  -6.18  2.51  3.67  0.09  -0.09 
1  0  3.13  -1.76  -1.37  -0.29  0.29 
1  1  -0.39  -0.03  0.43  -0.25  0.25 
1  2  -3.68  1.29  2.38  -0.21  0.21 
2  0  6.75  -3.87  -2.88  -0.60  0.60 
2  1  2.93  -1.88  -1.05  -0.57  0.57 
2  2  -0.68  -0.27  0.95  -0.52  0.52 
The results are also potentially important for policy. Our finding that education 
and labour supply are jointly determined implies that a second best case for 
subsidising education can be made if high marginal tax rates cause significant work 
disincentives
16. Indeed, since marginal tax rates are high on the rich (through the 
progressivity of the tax system) and the poor (through the effect of means tested 
welfare payments and tax credits) one might argue that there should be subsidies 
available for rich and poor. The tax deductibility of certain savings vehicles offers a 
way for rich parents to reduce the net cost of education for their children but since 
welfare recipients save little in such vehicles a means tested education subsidy may be 
the most efficient policy  – as well as having potentially desirable effects on 
 
14 We use very detailed code, derived from the IFS TAXBEN routines, to capture the tax and welfare 
rules. 
15 The simulated effect of the additional education keeping net  incomes constant are large. For 
example, adding 1 year to wives’ educations increases the wives’ average FT probability by close to 
0.6% compared to the increase of close to 1.5% in Table 6 which allows for the additional effect via the 
budget constraint.    13
inequality. The UK is about to introduce just such a policy – known as Educational 
Maintenance Allowances (EMAs). These will be payments to 16 and 17 year olds that 
are conditional on remaining in full-time education whose amounts will be means-
tested against parental income. Thus, while these simulation  results above illustrate 
the issues raised in the modelling, they are not of practical significance because policy 
would never be addressed to raising everyone’s education by one year. However, 
simulating the effects of EMA requires that we acknowledge the correlation between 
parental incomes and childrens’ school leaving decisions. Unfortunately the FRS data 
does not tell us about school leaving decisions of the children  – all we know if 
whether children (under 18) who are present in the household and still in education.  
Thus, we proceed as follows. We use the BHPS data to find the parental gross 
earnings (EMA is means tested against earnings) distribution corresponding to the 
recorded age at which we observe in BHPS children finished their education. Figure 1 
shows the means (reflated to 2001 by a  real earnings index) of this distribution which 
clearly shows the correlation between education and parental incomes
17. For every 
pair of parents in our FRS data we take a single draw from the BHPS distribution 
corresponding to their own school leaving age. So for men in FRS who are recorded 
left school at 16 we take a draw from the BHPS distribution of parental incomes for 
BHPS children who left school at 16. This allows us to estimate the EMA entitlement 
that every FRS observation would have faced had EMA existed when they were 
young. The simulated average amount paid in EMA is close to £20 per week and the 
distribution of this is shown in Figure 2. Notice that, while it is true that those who 
left school at an early age on average are simulated to receive most EMA we also find 
that large amounts of EMA would have been received by those individuals who would 
have stayed on in education without the subsidy. Averaging the amount paid to those 
who would have stayed on in the absence of the subsidy we find that 25% of EMA 
payments are deadweight.  
 
16 See Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1999) for some UK evidence on the impact of taxation on labour 
supply that exploits the reductions in marginal tax rates that have occurred over time. 
17 This is for the 1246 children in BHPS that have ever completed education. Note that the data is quite 
sparse for children leaving education at age 19, 20 and 23.    14
Figure 1    Gross Earnings Distributions 
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Figure 2  Estimated EMA Entitlements for FRS Adults 
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Figure 3  Distribution of Net Income Gains from EMA  
      by Age of Leaving Full Time Education 
   
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Age left FT education
N
e
t
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
£
/
w
e
e
k
)
Men
Women
   15
Having estimated EMA entitlements we then apply the estimated effects of a 
marginal pound of EMA obtained by Ashworth et al (2002) from their analysis of the 
EMA pilot areas
18 to estimate the probability that each individual would have been 
induced to stay on one and two further years
19. Table 6 gives the estimated effects on 
the probability of staying on for one and two additional years beyond 16. The effects 
for women are smaller because of the smaller estimated effect per pound of EMA 
from the evaluation study. 
Table 6    Estimated Probability of 1 or 2 Additional Years of Education 
Actual education leaving age:  16  17 
+1  5.3  0.3  Men 
+2  4.7  - 
+1  3.3  0.1  Women  +2  3.0  - 
Individuals who left at 16 and 17 are randomly assigned an extra year or two of 
education according to the estimated probabilities. We then calculate the direct effects 
of this additional education on education and labour supply and the indirect effects 
that work through the covariances in the error terms. This allows us to compute the 
effects on net incomes taking into account both the effects on gross wages and on 
labour supply as well as the interaction with the tax and welfare system. The result is 
in Figure 3 which shows that the benefits are almost entirely confined to individuals 
who would have left school at an early age
20. The average effects are small but they 
conceal wide variation arising from the fact that just a small proportion of individuals 
are indeed encouraged to increase their education. So, for example, for those men who 
left at 16 that do increase their education from 16 to 17 (around 5% ) the gain in net 
income is almost £20 per week. The effect over the whole population is a rise in 
average net incomes of £1.03 per week.  
 
18 EMA was evaluated by comparing the behaviour of recipients in pilot areas with that of non-
recipients in carefully matched control areas. The estimated effects of £1 of EMA receipt was 0.002427 
for boys and 0.00153 for girls. Thus, for a full entitlement of around £30 per week the predicted effect 
was a rise in the probability of staying on at 16 of around 7%. 
19 We assume that EMA does not change the probability of staying on beyond 18. 
20 Indeed the only reason why the benefits leak to those who left school beyond 17 is because they are 
married to individuals who left school below 18.   16
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
The aim of the paper has been to illustrate the importance of the interaction 
between labour supply and education in the determination of wage rates and incomes. 
This arises because of the importance of nonlinearities in the budget constraint 
induced by the means-tested welfare programmes and the income tax system  in the 
UK, and the correlation between unobservable preferences for work and education. 
We find that the correlation between work and education preferences, and between 
preferences for work and wages rates are statistically significant.  We reject the 
exogenous education model which has important implications for how we estimate 
labour supply models as well as how we compute the returns to education. 
Part of the motivation for the research is to see if we can exploit the joint 
determination of education and labour supply for policy purposes.  Thus, we use the 
estimated model to support a simulation of the effects of a education subsidy that is 
means-tested against parental income. We find that, because of the large variance in 
parental incomes at any level of education of children, there is a large deadweight loss 
of such a policy. However, extra education has a strong effect on living standards and, 
for those who are encouraged to invest in additional education there are large 
increases in net incomes. 
   17
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